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SOCIETAL STABILITY AND POLITICAL REFORM:
CHINESE POLITICS IN THE 1990s
Dr Wong Yiu-chung
Abstrαct

On 28 September 1995 , Jiang Zemin delivered one of the most
important speeches in his tenure as the General Secretary of the CCP
in the Fi丘h Plenum of 14th CCP Congress , which is entitled “ To
Handle Correctly Certain Relationships in the Process of Socialist
Modernization Construction". On the top of the agenda was the
relationships between reform, development and stability. To him,
reform , in particular economic reform, must be pursued;
development is the enhancing of national strength and stability is the
pre-condition of developmen t. Indeed , it is the equilibrium of these
three sets of relationships that the CCP leadership strove for that
shaped the major forces of dynamics of Chinese politics in the 1990s.
The leadership's overriding concern was stability of the regime.
Economic reform , with a temporary haul in the early 1990s , was
accelerated and culminated in the accession to the WTO , resulting
increasing absorption into world economy. Political reform was
considered secondary to economic reform and it was perceived to be
an inherently destabilizing process and any measures that would
cause controversies within the Party were to be shelved. Leaming
the lessons 企om the 4 June crackdown, ideological control was
exercised unrelentingly and dissidents intellectuals were punished
severely. Administrative streamlining was carried out two times in
the 1990s. Grass-root democracy was instituted and anti-corruption
drives waged but organized opposition was crushed mercilessly. So
were the ideological debates within the Party. The result was that
China's economic growth atlained admirable figures and it was
rapidly becoming a powerful economic house. However, behind the
growth phenomena, lies the abject poverty of the peasantry, massive
unemployment , labor unrest , frustrated intellectuals and rampant
corruption. Among the liberal intellectuals , the consensus was that
onlya genuine political reform program could alleviate the problems
that the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao new leadership is encountering.
Despite the political reform in several important area, however,

China po1itica1 reform programs have not surpassed the speech on
cadre and 1eadership by Deng Xiaoping in 1980, supposed1y the
most comprehensive politica1 reform b1ueprint in the reform era.
"About the political structural r，φ rm， (ou吵 greatest goal is to
a stable enνironment. 1 talk with the Americans, the highest
interest for China is stability." 16 June 1989 Deng Xiaoping
( 1993:313)

αchieve

Introduction
The 1980s began with the most comprehensive politica1 reform
packages ever devised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
announced by Deng Xi aoping in August 1980 in the expanded
meeting of the CCP Po1itburo but ended with the massive purges of
the 1ibera1 intellectua1s and reformist 1eadership. The 1990s started
with politica1 stagnation in the aftermath of the June 4 b100dbath but
ended , ideo1ogically, with the exposition of a new theory for the CCP,
the so- called ‘ Theory of Three Represents' in 2000 by Jiang Zemin.
lt 100ks as if the cycles of reform had emerged again. In fact , it has
no t. The pendu1um shift of policies from one extreme to another
1
disappeared in the 1990s. Deng died in February 1997 , five months
before the historic handover of Hong Kong to China by the British
govemment. Due to his fai1ing health , Deng had gradually 10st
po1itica1 inf1 uence since the 14th CCP Congress in 1992. The 1990s ,
especially the 1atter pa此， were dominated most1y by the persona1ity
of Jiang Zemin (Willy Lam 1999:13-18). At the .16th CCP Congress ,
his ‘ Theory of Three Represents' was inserted into the CCP
Constitution and recognized by the whole party to be a further
development of Deng Xi aoping Theory. On 28 September 1995 ,
Jiang Zemin delivered one of the most important speeches in his
tenure as the Genera1 Secretary of the CCP at the Fifth P1enum of
14th CCP Congress , which was entitled “ To Handle Correct1y Certain
Re1ationships in the Process of Socialist Modernization
Construction". At the top of the agenda was the re1ationships
between reform , development and stabi1ity. According to the top
1eadership, reform , in particu1ar economic reform , must be pursued;
deve10pment is the enhancing of national strength and stability is the

pre-condition of development. Indeed , it is the CCP leadership's
search for equilibrium in these three sets of relationships that shaped
the major forces and dynamics of Chinese politics in the 1990s.
Against this background , this chapter attempts to capture the pattern
of political development in the 1990s in general and the political
structural reform in particular.
Tightening Ideological Control
In the aftermath of the 4 June massacre , when Deng Xiaoping
(1 993 :287 ,290 ,306) said that the greatest failure in the reform era
was in education , he did not mean education in the traditional sense ,
such as knowledge acquisition , skill dissemination and moral
imbuing process. Wh at he meant was , in fact , the failure in the
CCP's ideological indoctrination in the education sectors ,
particularly among the university students. For, after all it was the
university students who initiated the 4 June pro-democracy
movement after the death of Hu Yaobang. In his view, the lack of
ideological control had led to the spread of the so-called bourgeois
liberalization and indirectly to the split of top CCP leadership and
the ensuing chaos following the death of Hu Yaobang on 15 April
1989. The top leadership has learnt two important lessons from the 4
June bloodshed. First, knowing the full impact of powerful modem
mass media, the conservative leadership realized . that strict
ideological censorship must be exercised upon the reformist
intellectuals , and second , a leadership split at the top must be
avoided at all costs for the split would endanger societal stability and
threaten the CCP directly. These are the lessons that the CCP
leadership is still taking in the 21 5t century.
Jiang Zemin ascended to power in the midst of 4 June purges ,
and he was involved in the decision-making process even before the
curfew was imposed on 20 May 1989 (Nathan and Link 2001). His
crackdown on Shanghai's World Economic Herald pleased the
hard-line leadership. In essence , Jiang was a conservative man
(Willy Lam 1999: 12-18). Having become the general secretary of
the CCP, he quickly shifted econ Olnic policies to the left. On one
occasion , he asserted that the CCP would make individual
enterprises bankrupt. His speeches were full of leftist rhetoric (1 989a;

1989b; 1990). A丘er the crackdown, the terrn ‘ political structural
reform' virtually became a taboo and it was banned in the mass
media for almost half a year. Starting in late 1989 , however, the term
began to reappear in the newspapers and gradually in Party
documents and policy announcements. However, the term was
used with a different connotation. With the crumbling of the
communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern European
countries , the CCP was determined to strengthen the Party authority
and fostered government administrative and extractive capacities. In
the mean time , premier Li Peng stated that political structural reform
had never stopped (1991). A condition had been attached to the
political structural reform , that is societal stability. The CCP
leadership tried now to refocus the contents of the political structural
reform by using the term ‘ political reform with Chinese
characteristics'. Li Peng (1 991) stressed that ‘ political restructuring
should be conducive to the stability and prosperity of the country
rather causing social disturbance.' Jiang Zemin considered that the
political structural reform should perfect socialist democracy and
legal system. He emphasized that Westem ideas of democracy and
freedom were not compatible with China's ‘ national conditions'. He
added that “ The (political structural reforrn) must be commensurate
with the country's tradition , history, culture , and the development
levels of education and theeconomy." (in Willy Lam , 1995: 242)
Furthermore , in the commemorative speech on the seventieth
anniversary of the CCP, in outlining the ‘ socialist politics with
Chinese characteristics' , Jiang Zemin (1991) declared that there
must be a ‘three insistence and three nos' policy' ,
We must insist on the people's democracy dictatorship , led by
the working class and based on the alliance of workers and
peasants; we must not weaken and abandon the people's
democracy dictatorship. We must insist and try to perfect the
NPC system and must not set up a system similar to Western
parliament. We must insist and perfect the multi party
cooperative system led by the CCP; we must not weaken or
negate the leadership of the CCP and adopt a Western type
multi party system (師告n Wei Po , 2 July 1991).

In early 1995 , Jiang pronounced that a loyal CCP member must
be able to distinguish the seven differentials between Marxism
and adulterated M訂幻 sm or bourgeois liberalization (Mirror June
1996:22). The seven contrasting pair of concepts are as follows:
First, the true Marxism must not be confused with anti-Marxism
or pseudo- Marxism. Second, the socialist economy versus
private ownership; third , socialist democracy versus Westem
parliamentary democracy; fourth , dialectical materialism versus
subjective metaphysics; fifth , socialism versus feudalism; sixth,
learning advanced things from the West versus blind worship of
the Western; finally, civilized and healthy style of lifestyle versus
a negative , decadent lifestyle.
In the wake of the 1989 crackdown , to protect himself from the
ultra-leftist attacks , Jiang had put forward a theory of Sumames: the
nature of refonn should be defined as either socialist or capitalist.
Reform capped with capitalist would be purged. With this move , the
conservative leadership would characterize all the reforms during
Hu-Zhao era as ‘capitalis t' and China's reform and the open era
would end. However, doctrinal purity was rejected by Deng
Xi aoping, who , on the contrary, formulated a theory of ‘ three
favorables': raising productivity, boosting the people 's standard of
living , and elevating the comprehensive strength of the nation
(Mirror April 1992:24-25). Any policy or measure that would be
favorable to the three tasks would be considered ‘ socialist\This was
the further development of his thesis of black cats and white cats.
Having lost two of his most intimate proteges in two years and
surrounded by bundles of conservatives , Deng began to be impatient
about the pace of economic reform (Mirror January 1991: 30-31;
February 1991 :26-27). He planned to restart the reform engine.
However, throughout the 1990s , the strategy that economic reform
preceded political structural reform remained the cardinal principle.
After the suppression of the pro-democracy movement, the CCP
obviously encountered another major legitimacy cnSlS which, to
Deng Xiaoping's mind , could only be saved by more radical
economic reform (De時 1993 :307).
Despite the political setbacks , Deng's determination to pursue
economic reform remained unshaken. In the second half of 1990 , he
allied with Shanghai Party secretary Zhu Ronji , to publish a series of

commentaries (pen name Wang Puping) , criticizing the conservative
backlash and insisting on the importance of the reform policies. At
the same time , Deng formulated 'no controversies' to advance
economic reform (Mirror April 1991 :28-29). The series of tactical
moves culminated in the trip to the Southem provinces (Nanxun) ,
which successfully tumed Jiang into a reformist, at least in the
economic arena. The victory of the Southern trip by Deng was
th
manifested in the 14 CCP Congress Political Report made by Jiang
(1 992). Ideologically, the Party should put its focus on anti-leftism
and economically, the establishment of a socialist market economy
was called for.
Ri ding with the wind of changes , the non-establishment
intellectuals headed by Yuan Hongbing, a Beida lecturer, published
an edited anti-leftism volume titled Lishi de Chaoliu (Currents of
Hist。可r). Hu Jiw缸， former editor-in-chief of People 50 Dai鈔， was one
of the writers. As soon as it was published , it was banned by the
Propaganda Department of the CCP. The book was charged with
three crimes. First, the essays were edited and written by the
activists in the 4 June events; second , this was a counter-attack by
the bourgeois rightist using Deng's southern trip as an excuse; third ,
the book revealed the problems between two views of reform
(Mirror June 1992:37-38). Not content with the ban , Yuan Hongbing
organized an academic forum titled “ Reform and Open Door Policy,
Strengthening the Country, Enriching the People" at which more
than a hundred of intellectuals including some writers of the volume
and other reformist intellectuals such as Wang Ruishui participated.
In a speech , Wang said that, in the reign of Maoist rule , leftism was
the main current of . thoughts , and this had destroyed China's
development for almost twenty years. Deng had reversed the leftist
trend by emphasizing reform but the habitual influence would not
eradicated so easily (Mirror July 1992:44-47). In the three years
since 4 June crackdown, this was the first time for a spontaneous
gathering organized by non-establishment intellectuals. The
conservative force strongly condemned the forum and Deng Liqun
personally attacked Yuan Hongbing for committing bourgeois
liberalization, a great crime after 4 June (Mirror July 1992:30). On
the eve of 14 th CCP Congress , a group of respectable writers
in c1 uding Ba Jin , Wang Meng , Hu Jiw缸， Yu Guangyuan and Sha

Yiexin , etc. published a volume entitled Fang Zuo Beiwanglu
(Memorandum on Preventing Leftism) and the literary monthly
Chinese Writers organized a forum in June and published the
speeches in the magazine. The focus was on “ eliminating the leftist
obstacles , literary writings can flourish" (Nineties January
1993:47-48). It was banned soon and the forum was attacked.
th
In the aftermath of the 14 CCP Congress , the top leadership
reached three points of consensus: first , quickening the process of
reform; second , shelving political reform measures and third ,
tightening ideological contro l. In maintaining political stability, the
Propaganda Department established an ideological monitoring unit
consisting of fifty personnel to examine materials in the mass media
位 the centrallevel (Mirror June 1993 :28-29)
Clearly, the new CCP leadership was wary of spontaneous
moves that were not controlled by the Party, even though they were
critical of conservative forces. Despite the harsh measures , the
non-official intellectuals tried to push political reform by petitions to
the top leadership. One of the earliest a吐empts was organized by
Chen Zimin who allied with eleven famous intellectuals , including
Liu Xiaobo , a literary critic and Chen Xi aoping, a legal expert. On
25 February 1995 , the group sent the petition, together with twelve
signatures , to the NPC. The gist of their petition was to demand that
the CCP curtail the rampant corruption. By writing a topic that was
the concern of the nation, they hoped that their petition would not be
perceived as a threat to the leadership. Following the first petition , it
was followed by two other petitions. On 28 February 1995 , the
student leader Wang Dang took the lead of organizing a petition,
signed by 22 people , demanding the CCP abolish the labor camp
system. On 2 March , Chen Zimin group also sent their second
petition to the Party, demanding the Party to “ preserve personal
freedom of citizens and abolish security detention" (Nineties April
1995:29-31).
The second wave of petition was sparked by the external events.
1995 was the year designated by the United Nations to be the Year of
Tolerance. Echoing the appeal , on 15 May 1995 , Xu Liangying , a
veteran scientist in the Academy of Science , organized a petition
signed by 45 intellectuals. The petition raised three demands: first , to
stop suppressing so- called ideological enemies , observing strictly
7

the freedom of thought and religious beliefs; second , to launch a
re-evaluation of the 4 June events and release all prisoners arising
from 4 June events; third , to release all prisoners and detainees
because of their thought or writings. Most surprisingly, the petition
was headed by Wang Ganchang , one of the foremost nuclear
physicists in China. On the eve of the sixth anniversaηr of 4 June
crackdown, Wang Zhihong , wife of Chen Zimin , and 52 others wrote
an appealletter titled “ To learn lessons of blood and pushing forward
democratic and legal processes". The letter demanded the CCP
should enact a series of legal codes to ensure the protection of
human rights for the citizens , which included Law of the Press , Law
of Assembly, Law of Constitutional Court and finally publish a
declaration of human rights and human freedom (Nineties June
1995:76-79).
Again , on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the 4 June events ,
105 victims' families , notably among them was former professor of
the People's University Ding Zilin , launched prosecution charges
against premier Li Peng who violated the principles of protecting
human life and freedom inherent in the Chinese constitution, United
Nations Charter and the Intemational Covenant of Civil and Political
Ri ghts which China had signed in the previous ye位 (Open July
1999:8-9). All these petitions and letters certainly fell on deaf ears.
Not only did the CCP not accept their moderate demands , but they
were instead harassed (Chen Zimin) , exiled (Wang Dang) , kept
under surveillance (Ding Zilin) , and made to recant (Wang
Ganchang).
Apart from petitions from so.cietal sectors (from the so- called
right) , there were petitions or appeals from the ‘ left' , coming notably
from Deng Liqun , once the underground general secretary in the
mid-1980s. In late 1995 , the neo-Maoists circulated a ‘ Ten-thousand
Character' petition titled “ Certain Factors that Affect out National
Security" among senior cadres , attacking marketization as if would
undercut the basis of socialism and would lead to the demise of the
CCP. It raised the specter of “ the substitution of the dictatorship of
the proletariat with the open and direct dictatorship of the
capitalists." (Willy Lam 1999:364). In early 1996 , the neo-Maoists
circulated another petition, waming of the emergence of a
‘Gorbachev-type' of leadership within the Party. It further warned

that ‘ peaceful evolution' was highly possible in China and the West
was looking for its representatives in China and neo-capitalists were
becoming a class (Open May 1996:18-19). In March 1997 , Deng
Liqun and his associates circulated the third petition titled “ Certain
Theoretical and Policy Problems Concerning Insisting the Status of
Public Ownership" , in an attempt to in f1 uence the agenda ofthe CCP
Congress held later in 1997. As the title suggested , the focus of the
petition was exclusively on the importance of public ownership. It
asserted that “ without the guiding status of the public ownership and
national economy, there would not be socia1ism with Chinese
characteristics" and it furth叮叮gued that “ if the guiding status of the
public ownership was lost , then the economic basis of the ruling
CCP would be gone and classes would be polarized. The state would
become the appendage of the international capitalism." (Open March
1997:54-61).
These orthodox Marxist treatises had little influence even in the
Party. More in f1 uential was the rise of neo-conservatives. The origin
of neo-conservatism can be dated back to the neo-authoritarianism in
the 1980s (Kalpana Misra 1998: 208-209). Joseph Fewsmith has
captured the spirit of the neo-conservatism by defining it as follows:
“(It) indicated a desire to find a middle path between the traditional
conservatism of the Old Left (as examplified ideologically by more
orthodox Marxist-Leninists such as Chen Yun) and ‘ radical
reformers' (as epitomized culturally by the film River Elegy and
economically by advocates of privatization). In general ,
neo-conservatism accepted market economics , albeit with some
caveats , but desired a greater role for the state."(Fewsmith 2001 :80).
Fewsmith was right when he po.inted out the middle ground position
of the ideological orientation of the neo-conservatism but he was
wrong when he said the position". . .. must be understood as a loose
term , indicating a set of concerns and a broad intellectual orientation
rather than a well developed and consistent body of thought"
st
(Fewsmith 2001: 80). By the beginning of the 21 century,
neo-conservatism or the new Left, together with liberalism, had
developed into the two main coherent and consistent bodies of
thoughts covering analyses on aspects such as the nature of Chinese
society, the nature of Chinese state , the notion of social justice , the
views on international situati
9

the developmental goal for China? the nature of civil society, the
role of e在iciency or equality, the notion of revolution or reform or
tradition , the nature of modemity, etc (Ming Pao Monthly May 2002:
33-40; Open June 1995: 48-52; Open December 1999:51-53).
The ideas of neo-conservatism were first systemically
expounded by a group of young intellectuals associated with China
Youth Daily in the a缸ermath of the failed Soviet coup in August
1991(Fewsmith 200 1: 98-100). They circulated a paper entitled
“ Realistic Responses and Strategic Options for China a丘er the
Soviet Upheaval". The monograph was associated with some
princelings such as Chen Yuan , son of Chen Yun , and Pan Yue , the
son- in- law of Liu Huaqing. The gist of the tract was to attack
both ideological extremes , the so-called ζutopian socialism' and
‘ utopian capitalism' , and strive for a middle ground. The central
concern was to how the CCP had changed from a revolutionary party
to a ruling party. They were certainly for the continuous governance
of the CCP but they were concemed about how politically stability
could be maintained. The theses were repeated when Pan Yue
submitted a paper on the changing status of the CCP in the late
1990s (Open July 200 1: 28-38). In retrospect, the paper was ignored
by the Jiang-Zhu leadership.
Sha Yiexin, a veteran drama script writer, pointed out that the
propaganda machine of the CCP had four features. First, the Party is
supreme. According to the “Theory of Three Represents" , the Party
represents the whole nation and therefore could not be criticized.
Second , the uniformity of public opinion, so it allows no dissenting
voice. Third , all mass media are the mouthpiece of the Party/state.
Fourth , no law would be passed to govern mass media. The late
Chen Yun had told the following to the party members: “ In KMT
period , they had passed a press law. We studied it and made use of
its loopholes. Now we don't have to pass the law. We could do
whatever we like" (Open September 2003: 89-91).
China claims publicly that there is no press censorship but , in
fact , the censorship is most rigorous. All the propaganda
departments of the Party Committees at various levels exercise
censorship. Furthermore , the Party Committees in the mass media
also exercise censorship and more sensitive materials would be
submitted to the Propaganda Ministry of the CCP for decision. After
10

the reform policies were launched , control began to loosen. Since the
Fourteenth CCP Congress , the Propaganda 孔1inistry set up a “ Press
News Reading and Assessment Coordinating Unit" to exercise
contro l. After the Fifteenth CCP Congress , the Ministry instructed
different provinces and cities to set up “ Reading and Assessment
Teams" to serve as censorship units. The result was a long list of
banned books , joumals and magazines. Numerous editors and
publishers were wamed , penalized and driven out from the
professions (Open August 2003: 83 -89)?
Suppressing Organized Opposition
The CCP is a highly unified Party/state/ military structure.
Despite the incessant ideological and political conflicts within the
p 叮叮， it has never allowed external political societal forces to grow
unhindered even in the reform era. Along with the marketization of
the economy, the coercion over the society has shrunken
considerably but the CCP has never tolerated organized opposition
or even potential organized forces. The 4 June events certainly
taught the Party a good lesson. “ Nipping the disturbances in the bud"
的 the former Beijing mayor Chen Xitong said. ln fact , this has been
the guiding principle in tackling the non- CCP forces in the past two
decades. Even in economic corporations , the Party very often
occupies the dominant position. More recently, the Party called for
the revival of the Party cells in all economic enterprises , even under
the relatively relaxed climate of Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao new
leadership (Ming Pαo 20 August 2003).3
The harsh crackdown in the aftermath of the 4 June killings
silenced all political dissent within the Party as well as outside.
ldeological 旬， the elites became more conservative and calling for
stability became the focus of the regime efforts. In early 1992 , 4
June student leaders Wang Dan and Guo Haifeng were given
medical parole. As the final lntemational Olympic Committee vote
approached in September veteran activists Wei Jingsheng , Xu Wenli
and Wang Juntao were freed in a move to impress upon the
Olypmpic Committee members Beijing's good wiI1 in observing
human rights. But the activists had not organized together then and
they were only marginally connected with each other (Teresa Wright
11

2002: 907-908). After the failure of the bid to host the ye前 2000
Olympics , the political climate became tense again and the activities
of the dissenters became more intense , so the oppression came and
Wei and Wang were arrested again.
ln the late 1990s , the external environment provided a fertile
soil again for the development of the dissent. ln 1997 , China signed
the lnternational Covenant on Economic , Social , and Cultural Ri ghts.
The US president Clinton was planning a visit to China in June 1998
and UN High Commissioner for Human Ri ghts Mary Robinson
came to China in September 1998. ln October, China signed the
lnternational Covenant on Civil and Political Ri ghts. ln the
meantime , internally, the ‘ counter-revolutionary' c1 ause was repealed
by the NPC in March and substituted by the c1 ause of ‘ national
security' , a move showing the continuing de-ideologization of the
CCP. ln September the same year, the Fifteen CCP Congress called
for the need to rule by law and made references , for the first time , to
human rights. Under the relaxed c1 imate , Wang Youc缸， one of the
1989 student leaders , had the idea forming an opposition party and
he was perhaps influenced by Wang Bingzhang who was the founder
of China Spring and had earlier slipped into China to contact
dissidents in early 1998. He was found and expelled. Wang and his
friends in Hangzhou decided to announce the news on the eve of
Clinton's visit, hoping that the timing would preclude official
suppression. On 25 June , the group presented an “ Open De c1 aration
of the Establishment of the China Democracy Party (CDP) Zhejiang
Preparatory Committee" and a draft constitution. The aim of CDP
was to “ establish a constitutional democratic political system" and
peaceful means must be used in processes. The group “ opposes
terrorist activities" (Teresa Wright 2002:910). Subsequently,
preparatory committees began to fonn in twenty- four provinces and
cltles.
The UN Covenant on Civil and Political Ri ghts guarantees the
right to form political parties but no legal procedures had been
developed in China to establish the status. The preparatory
committee of the CDP tried to test the official limit by applying for a
legal status at the Zhejiang provincial civil affairs bureau.
Surprisingly, the bureau accepted the application. But later Wang
was detained and interrogated. He was told his application was
12

rejected. In the following months , five provincial preparatory
committees had tried to register in different civil affairs bureaux but
some were refused and some received no response. Evidently, the
leadership in Beiji時 was contemplating how to response to these
applications. In early November, the CDP members , among them the
veteran activist Xu Wen缸， declared the establishment of the “ First
CDP National Congress Preparatory Work Group". Shortly after,
they also set out to form a “ CDP Beijing-Tianjin Regional Part
Branch" , the first time a national opposition party was founded after
1949.
However, the repression was swift. With the departure of
Clinton and Mary Robinson, the favorable extemal factors were
gone. Most of the chief organizers were arrested. In July and
October 1999 , there were more detentions and imprisonment of the
dissidents. Some managed to escape and some went into hiding.
Beginning in December, almost all CDP leaders were rounded up
and imprisoned. By the end of 1999 , the CDP had ceased to exis t.
Despite its moderate demands and peaceful action, the CDP was still
repressed. However far the reform stride may be , the official
tolerance of opposition was extremely limited under the Jiang Zemin
reign. However, there was a new characteristic which was the wide
use of the internet in disseminating news and information (Teresa
Wright 2002:919-921).4
Similarly, the Falun Gong sect saga provides another example
of using the internet to make liaison among the followers and
eventually to be perceived as posing a threat to the CCP leadership.
The most publicized event of F，α lun Gong was the encirclement of
Zhongnanh缸， the nerve center of the CCP political establishment , by
over 10 ,000 members from six provinces and municipalities on 25
April 1999 (Open May 1999:17-19). According to the Xi nhua
reports , before the 25 April incident, the Falun Gong followers had
organized 18 encirclements , demonstrations , and attacks on media,
TV stations , and even encircled municipal government buildings in
different provinces. Between 19 and 23 April 1999 , Professor He
Zouxiu , a member of Academy of Science at Tianjin , wrote an
article arguing against the youth to practicing qigong and he also
criticized Falun Gong as unscientific. Subsequently, Falun Gong
members assembled about 1,600 members to protest against the
13

article before the Tianjin municipal government. Several days later,
the followers targeted at Zhongnanhai.
Falun Gong was a religious and quasi-religious group without
any hierarchy and organizational structure , according to its adherents.
But the authorities claimed otherwise and charged that it had a strict
hierarchical order and structure and had Li Hongzhi as its head
(James Tong 2002: 637-638). The society was founded in 1992 by Li
Hongzhi. In the beginning , he gave qigong seminars and training
sessions and soon gained enormous in f1 uence in various provinces.
In October 1996 he went to the USA with a tourist visa and since
then he was able to have a green card and stayed in the US. By the
time the Falun Gong movement was banned in July 1999 , the
regime claimed that it had 39 main stations , 1,900 guidance stations ,
詣， 263 practice sites across the country and 2.1 million practitioners
inside China (Brightness Daily 15 August 1999). Some estimates
were even larger. According to a Guangdong source Nanfang Ribao
(Southern Daily 27 July 1999) , it had a following of 130 million.
The sect has traditional Buddhist and Daoist elements.
Essentially, it is not different from traditional religions (Kang
Xi aoguang 2000: 160-164). The reasons that in a span of several
years the Falun Gong could appeal to millions of followers inside
China as well as overseas must be sought in the context of the
marketization reform since the late 1970s. All religions are sets of
belief systems. The collapse of Marxist-Leninist ideologies and the
cult of Mao after the reforms have had a profound impact on the
psychology of ordinary citizens. The revival of traditional religions
in the reform era ‘ was a substitute for the ideological void in a
rapidly changing Party/state context. The spread of Christianity and
Catholicism was heavily constrained by the CCP leadership and was
forced to go underground in developing followers. Falun Gong
emerged and spread its influence by disguising itself as one of the
health-strengthening traditional qigong practicing groups. According
to Kang Xioaguang, a member of the Academy of Sciences , four
factors contributed to the appeal of the F，α lun Gong (2000: 169: 178).
First , the rise of Falun Gong was a spiritual response to the crisis in
faith on the part of population in the context of valuational confusion
created by the demise of communist ideology and Mao 's cul t.
Second , as a millennial movement , t
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was important in the doctrine. The market reforms had created an
extremely poverty gap and the concentration of political power
enabled the CCP Party/state to exercise unrelenting coercion to stifle
general disconten t. Falun Gong at least , in the pursuit of justice in
the futu間， satisfied the partial psychological and spiritual needs of
the population. Third , as a health-strengthening organization, the
sect' s qigong and various training exercises were body strengthening
moves. Moreover, the market reform in the public sector in general
and the hospital sector in particular had made medial costs very
expensive. Without a credible social insurance system , it is
imperative to keep one's body healthy. The sect fulfilled the
psychological need for security. Fourth , as a social organization,
mankind is constantly in search of group identity. In the actual
organizations or work units , one is confronted with interest pursuits
and power intriguing struggles and only in this spiritual organization,
one 's equality was totally achieved and one need not worry about the
greed , thirst for power, corruption and hypocrisy.
However, similar to the Christian church and the Catholic
church , what the CCP feared most was not the religious beliefs but
rather the organizational power that Falun Gong manifested during
the 25 April 1999 incident. Most alarmingly, other religious groups
were in its control , yet before the incident the CCP knew nothing
about the group (Open June 1999: 11-13 ). As Kang Xiaoguang
rightly pointed out (2000:2) ,"The conflicts between the CCP and
Falun Gong were not in the belief or whether it was an evil cult or
not, but in the organization, in the number of followers. It has too
many followers , and thus is beyond official tolerance. A deeper issue
is the question .of who has the power to organize groups. Could
people organize groups in pursuit of common interest? Or whether
the power is in the hand of govemment or people?"
Strengthening the NPC-Three Cornered Power Game?
In the 198 侃， the National People's Congress (NPC) was
revived and transformed and its powers were greatly expanded under
the new constitution of 1982. The institution had made substantial
progress in the liberalization orientation. According to the official
source , the total number of laws enacted by the NPC and the
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Standing Committee (SC) of the NPC from 1979 to 1998 amounted
to 332, which covered administrative, economic, criminal and civil
areas (People s Daily 23 March 1998). The NPC deputies had
f1 ashed their muscles on the voting of state presidents, premiers and
chairmen of the NPC, mostly by negative votes or abstention votes.
The process of shaking off the rubber-stamp image of the NPC
was accelerated in the early 1990s under the chairmanship and
vice-chairmanship of Qiao Shi and Tian Jiyun , two noted reformists
who had been appointed at the Eighth NPC held in March 1993.
First of all, Qiao began to recruit foreign legal experts to reorganize
the NPC's Legislative Commission which drafted the country's
economics legislation and laws , as the economic reform"went into
full swing after Deng's southem trip. Second, Qiao followed the late
NPC chairman Peng Zhen's policies of legal reform in the 1980s ,
making full use of the its SC as the operative mechanism. In fact, the
SCNPC gained expanded power bestowed by the new constitution in
1982. The NPC has developed several other functions besides
law-making. The function of supervising judicial and administrative
apparatus was strengthened and it has also established administrative
penalties for misconduct on the part of officials in administrative and
judicial organizations. It has exercised the investigation power in
law enforcement more often. From 1994 to 1996, the SCNPC had
organized forty-six inspection groups for the purpose of monitoring
the enforcement of the laws at the sub-national levels and reports
were sent to the SCNPC after inspection. The SCNPC would discuss
these reports and referred to relevant authorities for the solution
(Wang J. 1999:91). The legislators were pushing for a Law . of
Supervision that would enable the deputies to call from State
Council senior officials and judicial units to explain their policies or
to impeach them if they failed to justify their policies by 1997 or
1998. It was resisted by the officials (Ming Pao 20 November 1996).
Since the late 1980s , the NPC had tried to assert its role
independent of the Party and government. The 1995 statute of the
de c1 aration of the Martial Law was an example. Knowing the
coerciveness of the martial law troops during June 1989 , the law
tried to restrain the troops by introducing stipulations such as that
“ Martial law personnel should as far as possible avoid using
weapons." In the Third Plenary S
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April 1995 , the NPC demonstrated its institutional assertiveness in
three occasions. Firstly, Wu Bangguo and Jiang Chunyun, two close
followers of Jiang Zemin , nominated to be vice-premiers , were
elected with more than one-third of negative votes from the deputies ,
to the astonishment of the Politburo. Secondly, the Education and
Banking laws were rejected by one-fourth ofthe delegates. Third , in
the Fourth Plenary Session of the Eighth Congress held in March
1996 , over a quarter of the delegates refused to grant approval to the
work reports of both the Supreme People's Court and Supreme
People's Procuratorate. Furthermore , the amendments to the
Criminal Procedure Code were another piece of evidence on the
NPC's assertion of independent power. The amendments were
drafted by the SCNPC and passed in the 1996 Plenary Session. The
amendments greatly liberalized criminal procedures in the PRC.
However, it was met with strong opposition from the Ministry of
Public Security (MPS) and the Supreme People's Procuratorate
because the amendments included some lenient provisions such as
the abolition of administrative detention. In China, it is stiU a widely
practiced procedure that allowed the security organs to incarcerate
suspected persons indefinitely without trial or gaining access to a
lawye r.
There were other acts of rebellion by the NPC and sub-national
people's congresses. In January 1993 , the provincial people's
congress of Zhejia時 was supposed to elect a new governo r. The
Party committee , through the presidium , nominated the incumbent
governor Ge Hongsheng , a new rising star, who had been recently
elected as one of the Central Committee (CC) members. The
deputies ignored the signals from the above and nominated two more
candidates for competition. One withdrew and the other contestant
Wan Xueyuan , one of vice governors , was elected. In the
competitive elections for the vice governors , six of the nine
candidates nominated by the deputies were elected (Cheng Ming
April 1994 夕 -11). In May 1989 , the Hunan provincial people's
congress moved to impeach the vice govemor Yang Huiquan whose
inability and corruption angered the deputies. The deputies were
successful in dismissing him (Ming Xi a 2000: 168). In Minqing
county of Fujian province in March 1994 , the county people's
congress vetoed a government decision about the price of tap wate r.
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However, the govemment did not accept this and proceeded with the
decision. The congress openly condemned the move and forced it to
cancel the decision (An Chen 1999: 201). The provincial people's
congress of Guangdong declined to confirm the appointment of the
two department heads in February 2000. Shenyang municipal
people's congress of Liaoning did not pass the work report of the
municipal court in February 200 l. The municipal people's congress
of Hechi of Guangxi province rejected the government work report
on the management of the intemet bars. In January 2003 , the
municipal people 's congress of Yueyang of Hunan province failed to
elect the mayor nominated by Party committee in the first round and
he was finally elected in the second round but the election process
was strongly condemned by the deputies (Apple 5 January 2003). In
May 2003 , in Shenzhen Futian district, a Party-nominated candidate
was defeated in the election of the deputies and Wang Lian巴， a US
educated master-degree holder, won the election as an independent
(Apple 22 May 2003) .
As the marketization of the economy proceeds and China's
merging with the world capitalist economy accelerates after the
accession to the WTO, the NPC and the sub-national people 's
congresses have been gaining enormous powers and authority, which
were manifested in the following aspects. First, legislative
effectiveness: notwithstanding the national legislature which has
made more 300 laws since the late 1970s , more than 5,300 local
laws were passed by the sub-national people's congresses. Second,
economic decision-making: As China's economy becomes more
intemationalized and the burden to legislate lies in the NPC. In fact,
most of the legislation was concemed about economics. Third,
expanding power in the periphery: The NPC had given generous
support to the legislative processes in the sub-national level , such as
the support given to the Hunan provincial people 's congress in
ousting the vice governo r. Fourth, judicial review: the power to
interpret the laws and determine the constitutionality of local laws
and administrative decrees lies in the NPC. Fifth, informational
power: the NPC has become a cohesive institution in the whole
political system. Sixth, veto power, the NPC and sub-national
people's congresses certainly have the veto power vis-as-vis the
personnel appointment. The potential restraint imposed by this
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power served to remind the CCP of its limitations (Ming Xi a 2000:
127-128).
However its secondary role in the Chinese polity has remained
unchanged. During the 4 June crisis , despite the calling of an urgent
meeting and potential impeachment of Li Peng by more than fi街
SC members of the NPC , they were not able to convene a plenary
meeting to investigate the Tiananmen chaos. The incidents show
the feebleness ofthe NPC. The CCP leadership believed that the role
of the NPC in the 1990s should not be changed. A few days a丘er
the crackdown , Deng addressed the officers of troops of the curfew,
stating the inviolability of the existing political structure. He said “ 1n
the reform of the political structure , 'one thing is certain: we must
adhere to the system of the people's congress instead of practicing
the separation of the judicial , executive and legislative powers upon
the American pa位ern. As a matter of fact , not all the Western
countries follow the pattern of separation of powers" (Deng
1994:299).
Despite the negative votes , the refusal to pass the
Party-nominated candidates for official positions , and other
supervisory mechanisms exercised by the NPC or local people's
congresses in the 1990s , there have been control mechanisms by the
CCP over the legislative bodies that would make the collective
rebellion of the members almost impossible. First , most if not all the
NPC deputies were CCP members. Approximately, two-third of the
deputies from 1988 to 1998 were CCP members. 1n particular for the
SC members of the NPC , it was estimated that since 1983 the
percentage of CCP members in SCNPC was not below 75 (An Chen
1999: 163). With the dominant in f1 uence by the Party members in
the NPC and SCNPC , it was guaranteed that the legislative intent
would not deviate from the Party line. Second ，如rthermore ， there
existed the Party committee within the SCNPC , which could
command the loyalty of the Party members. The Party committee
could at the same time serve as a bridge between the Party and state.
Despite the lack of detailed analyses of the intemal channels of
communications within the Party/state , it is widely known that every
piece of important legislation must be examined and approved by the
CCP Politburo. 1n a move to control the provincial people's
th
congresses , starting with the 14 CCP congress , the Party's first
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secretary should at the same time hold the chairmanship of SC of the
people's congresses and during the 1990s , this practice was widely
adopted.
After two decades of reform and the strengthening of the NPC ,
has the political system become a three- cornered power game or are
the three corners of equal angles (An Chen 1999: 166-171)? Or has
the system become a ‘ semi-anticipatory democracy' (Ming Xi a 2000
128)? The answer is far from definite. ln spite of greater tolerance
towards intra-party/state dissent, it is clear that the CCP has always
remained the power arbitrator.
Administrative Reform
Comparing with the strengthening of the NPC , which serves as
a relatively minor check and balance on the State Council , the
administrative reform or streamlining of the bureaucracy was the
most important reform measure in the 1990s from the top leadership.
Similar to the 1980s, there were two waves of administrative reform
in the 1990s. The first one started in 1993 and the second one in
1998. The background to the administrative reform or organizational
restructuring was , on the one hand, China's inexorable march
towards a marketized economy and , on the other hand , the
re-emergence of bureaucratism in the early 1990s.
At the
Fourteenth CCP Congress held in October 1992 , the leadership
called for the establishment of a socialist market economy. ln 1993 ,
the CCP even desired to achieve a socialist market system before the
end .of the twentieth century. Jiang Zemin's Political Report (1 992)
stated the importance of administrative reform in the process of
rapid modernization. He stated that “ If we are to reform the political
structure , deepen the economic reform , establish a market economy
and accelerate the modernization drive , we must make it our urgent
task to streamline the organizational structure and to simplify
administrative layers." He condemned the phenomena of
bureaucratism , such as “ bloated bureaucracy, over-staffing, merging
of government and enterprises which directly hinder the deepening
economic reform and influence the relationships between the Party
and people."
The budget of the Party/government personnel had almost
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become unbearable. In 1979 , the number of Party/state cadres was
2.79 million. Ten years later, it had shot up almost double to 5.4 3
million and in 1998 , there were 30 million cadres. In twenty years ,
the number of government personnel increased more than ten times.
The population increase certainly was less than ten times in twenty
years (Liu Zhifeng 1998: 63). In the first halfof 199郎， the changes
of the government function , which means the separation of the
govemment and enterprises became the focal point of the political
structural reform , along with the administration in the state
machinery (Chan and Drewry 2001). The separation of government
from the enterprises was seen as the beginning of the switch of
government function. In addition , the ultimate goal of the
administrative reform was to establish a socialist market economy,
which would pave the way for the accession to the WTO. After the
Sixteenth CCP Congress , the reform focus shifted to instituting
so-called grass-root democracy in the countryside or villages. In
engineering the 1993 State Council reform , Li Peng basically
summarized the administrative reform in the 1980s as a failure . He
criticized the bureaucracy's failure to meet the challenges of
modemization or economic development. The problems nowadays
in the state apparatuses were “ merging of the state and enterprises ,
the relationships not well defined , bloated staffing and low
efficiency" (1993).
In the.early 1990s , the organizational units including ministries ,
commissions , affiliated and working organizations had increased
from 80 in 1988 to 86 in 1993. The total number of Party/state
cadres at the end of 1991 was 9.2 million and fiscal expenditure was
140 billion yuan , accounting 37 0/0 of the GDP. The reform proposal
attempted to reduce the total number of staff from 36 ,700 to 29 ,200
in the central administration , a 20% reduction , cutting 86 working
units to 59 (Liu Zhifeng 1998:306-307). The refonn concentrated on
changing the pattern of the economic ministries. The sectoral reform
or streamlining took place in three ways. First , some government
ministries were changed to jingji shiti (economic entities) with no
administrative functions. The administration and running of these
entities were left to market forces , such as the abolition of the
Ministry of Aeronautical Industry and setting up of the Aeronautical
lndustrial Company, etc. Second , some departrnents bec
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hangye zonghui (p rofessional associations) , which would be
subordinated directly to the State Council , and they were established
to replace some ministries such as the Ministries of Light lndustries
and Textile. The goal of these professional associations was to
co-ordinate policies and exercise macro-supervision over the
professions and facilitate services for the professionals. Finally, the
carryover or newly-created administrative ministries featured were
given streamlined administrative structures , which would engage in
planning , coordination, servicing and supervision of the industries
concemed. The retained Ministries included Railway, Transport ,
Forestry, and Agriculture , etc. The newly set up Ministries included
Ministries of Mechanical lndustry, Electronic lndustry, etc. To
improve the efficiency of the State Council , reshu旺ling also took
place within the State Council's affiliated organizations and it took
three forms , first , retaining the important working units , such as
Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office; second , merging with the
original ministries and becoming a sub-unit or ju (bureau) , such as
National Earthquake Bureau and National Property Management
Bureau; third , merging with the Ministries and becoming a zhineng
ju
如nctional bureau) such as the National Herbal Medicine
Management Bureau. With these measures , the number of affiliated
and working units was reduced from 44 to 18 (GOSC 1995:8-10).5
Luo Gan , then secretary-general of the State Council , decreed
that the government departments had to change functions , simplify
administrative structure and decentralize decision-making power, in
line with marketization reform. The government bureaucracy must
be simplified and the enterprises have to enhance the competitive
edge by entering the market. ln the reform process , twenty-seven
ministries and departments were eliminated , including seven
specialized economic departments. The number of cadres was
reduced by 20 percent, from 36 ,700 to 29 ,200 (GOSC 1995: 10)
The 1990s was a rapidly developing era for China. Econ Olnic
growth was in double-digit figures and incorporation into the world
capitalist economy quickened process. The negotiations with the
USA over the accession to the WTO had been going on since the
mid-1980s. However, by mid-1990s , the administrative reform
seemed to be failing in the midst of the marketization of the
,
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“ Although achievement had been made in the previous reform
a社empts ，

because of the 0 伊ctive constraints , a lot of problems
remained unresolved. The contradictions between the organizational
apparatus and socialist development had become increasingly
app訂e剖， such as over-staff bureaucracy, inseparation of the
govemment and enterprises , the growth of bureaucratism and
corruption and fiscal burden." In 1998 , China had 33 million
Party/state cadres whose salaries were paid by the state. Among
them 25 million personnel belonged to various kinds of public
institutions and 8 million were cadres at all levels of the
administration (Chan and Drewry 2001 :557). The financial budget of
these sta在 accounted for almost 40 0/0 of the total budget of the state
(Liu Zhife時 1998:24-25)
The 1998 administrative reform was the most drastic and
comprehensive organizational streamlining in the history ofthe PRC.
40 ministries and commissions in the State Council were slashed to
29 , a reduction of 27 010. More than 200 bureaus , about 25% of the
total , were also abolished. Furthermore , the reform aimed to reduce
the State Council employees to 16 ,700 , a reduction of 47.5% (GOSC
1998:39). In 1997 , Jiang Zemin had already laid bare the rationale
and principles of this administrative reform. In his Report to the
th
Sixth Plenum of the 15 CCP Congress , he said ,
In accordance with the requirement of a socialist market
economy we need to alter the functions of the government
and sep缸ate them from those of enterprises so that
enterprises will be truly given the power with regard to
production , operation and management. Follo "Y ing the
principle of simplification , uniformity and efficiency in
reform , we
shall
establish
a highly
efficient ,
well-coordinated and standard administrative system , with a
view to improving its service to the people. The departments
in charge of comprehensive economic management should
shift their functions to macroeconomic control , and
specialized economic departments should be reorganized or
reduced. We shall improve the works of departments
supervising law enforcement and cultivate and expand social
intermediary organizations. We shall deepen the reform of
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the administrative system , statutorily delimiting the
structures, functions sizes and working procedures of the
state organs and ensuring that their sizes are kept within
authorized limits and their redundant personnel are reduced.
There are three measures suggested in the Repo此， namely changing
some ministries into enterprises or corporations set up under the
State Council, streamlining or the outright abolition of some
govemment ministries or commissions, and the downsizing of staff.
The direction of the reform was similar to the 1993 reform and the
overall goal of the reform was to create a ‘ small government, big
society' environment which could facilitate economic reform. After
the ninth NPC in March 1998 , the administrative reforrn began to
take full force. First，的 out of 40 ministries and commissions of the
State Council were eliminated, such as the Ministries of Electrical
Industries, Mechanical lndustries, lnternal Trade and Labor, etc.
Second , half of the 32 ,000 personnel within the State Council would
be transferred or discharged. The guiding principle in the reform
regarding personnel was that no one was to be unemployed. The
personnel had to be either re-deployed or retrained. In three years ,
one million central and local govemment cadres positions were cu t.
Third , in the planned economy era, the ministries and commission
were designed to micro-manage the economy and state enterprises.
Some economic management units were downgraded from
commission and ministry status to departmental status. Their powers
and functions were limited to three major tasks: macro management ,
guidance in structuring industry and facilitation of fair competition
among business sectors. The direct management of enterprises was
prohibited. The State Planning Commission would be redesigned as
the State Development Planning Commission. The State Planning
Commission had been directing the economy since the 1950s but the
new renamed Commission would take charge of macro management
of regulation, long term development planning and the maintenance
of general economic equilibrium. Market forces would be the chief
determinant of the economy. In addition, the Organization Laws of
the State Council would be revised to provide more flexibility in
regulation. Fourth, four ministries and commissions were newly
created to meet the challenges imposed by the advent of
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globalization such as Ministries of Information Industry, Labor and
Social Security, etc. There were 22 carry-over ministries and
cOlnmissions. At the locallevel , the Organization Laws of Localities
would give more autonomy to the local governments in
implementing central gove口lll1ent policies. Finally, local
governments would have to follow the reform measures but local
variations would be allowed and also the extent of marketization in
the Western regions was different from the coastal developed areas.
Chinese social scientists have labeled the cycles of
streamlining-swe l1 ing-re-streamlining re-swe lI ing as ‘ historic
vicious cycles' (Liu Zhifeng 1998 :317). All previous a位empts at
re-organization had failed. Hsia Jingkl泣， a political scientist 剖
Beij ing University analyzed the ‘ vicious circles' or lack of success in
organizational reform as being due to five factors. First, the CCP as a
ruling party had designated Marxism and Leninism's democratic
centralism as theoretical guiding line for the Party as well as whole
country. Centralization was the key feature of the system. Second ,
the systemic features of the former Soviet Union had a shaping
influence
on
the
formation
of
the
existing
PRC
socio-political-economic system. The influence was difficult to erase.
Third , under the reign of Mao , efficiency was not an important factor
worth mentioning. The PRC always emphasized the importance of
quantity rather quality. Therefore , streamlining was not considered
necessary in eradicating bureaucratism. Fourth , perhaps influenced
by traditional dynastic conventions , the Party/state cadres had the
psychological factor that they could not be demoted or downgraded.
This allowed for the expansion of bureaucracy. Fifth, the Perhaps the
most important factor was institutional. For a long time , there has
not been any institutional check or curbing on the centralization of
power ofthe CCP (Liu Zhifeng 1998: 323-324). Despite the fact that
the marketization reform was in full force in China, it is difficult to
believe that the organizational reform measures would succeed given
the past experiences-6
Instituting Grass-roots Democracy
Besides the organizational streamlining which focused on the
separation of the government and enterprises and efficiency
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enhancement within the bureaucracy, the CCP leadership seemed to
play up the grass-roots or self rule elections since the mid-1990s.
Grass-roots elections or democracy was another big piece of
political structural reform in the second half 1990s. After 1949 , there
were three stages of development in the organization of grass-roots
structure in the rural areas. First, from 1949 to 1957 , was a stage in
which the xiang (town) administrative structure co-existed with
agricultural co-operatives. Second, from 1958 to 1982 , People's
Communes were established and then dissolved. Large and small
production teams also existed. Finally, after 1982 , the new state
constitution was passed and decreed the establishment of village
committees in the rural areas. There were three phases in the
development of the village self rule. First, from 1982 to 1987 , this
phase began with the 1982 state constitution which requires the
establishment of the resident committees and village committees in
the rural and urban areas as mass self rule organizations. Second ,
from 1987 to 1990 , the Provisional Organic Law 01 the Village
Committee 01 the People s Republic 01 China was promulgated by
the 13 th Standing Meeting ofthe Sixth NPC in 1987 , stating that the
law came to effect on 1 June 1988. Third , after 1990 , the self rule
governance was accepted by the top CCP leadership and extended to
the whole country (Bai Yihu丸 Yang Kaiwang and Chih-yu Shih
1998: 255-257). The origin of the village committees emerged in
two Guangxi counties (Yishan and Luocheng) in late 1980. The first
Villagers Representative Assembly was set up in nanlou village
(Hebei). The village committees were formed by local villagers and
cadres to manage village affairs in the midst of the breakup of the
People's Commune and production teams. They reported to the
higher authorities and finally Beij ing accepted and legitimized the
formal structure in the 1982 state constitution (O'Brien and
Lianjiang Li 2000:465).
Officially, the 930 ,000 villages across the country were
required to hold elections on village heads and committee members
after 1988. Between 1988 and 1990 , about 1,093 villages were
selected by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) to be trial cases. The
MAC set up special training workshops to recruit cadres to conduct
the village committee elections. In the early 199仇， the MAC
selected the “ demonstration villages" by applying the official
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guidelines which were adopted and made public in April 1994. The
guidelines decreed that direct and competitive elections must be held
at the village leve l. Second , the “ village representative assemblies"
should be established and oversee the elected village committees.
Lastly, village charters and codes of conduct for cadres and villagers
by the representative village assemblies were issued.
Direct democracy at the village level was backed up by the
CCP leadership as a whole. Li Peng said that “ 1n our country
democracy starts with the grass-roots , because for an ordinary
villager the person who is of direct concern is not the governor or
the county magistrate... .but the chairman of the village
committee."(SCMP 1 December 199兇8). Zh仙
lU Ron
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1屯羽皂剖ji (1 999
蚓
仍)
9
emphasized 血
t ha
剖t
that reflect the public opinion so that public opinion could be
削1' s decision making process. We must
absorbed into the governmen
further strengthen the system of democratic decisions and cautiously
and consisten t1 y develop the function of the village committees." 1n
the Fifteenth CCP Congress in 1997 , Jiang Zemin (1 997) pointed out
that “ To extend grass-root democracy, guarantee the direct exercise
of democratic rights , manage their own affairs and create a happy
life , are the widest practice of socialist democracy." Evident1 y, from
the 0 缸icial perspective , village elections both have the form and
substance of democracy. According to the official documents , they
fulfilled five purposes. First , the villagers have the power to manage
their own affairs and are the masters of their future. Second , the
elections show that the villagers have the ability to exercise
democratic rights. Third , the elections improve the relationships
between the villagers and Party/state cadres and eased tensions on
both sides. Fourth , the elections improve the relationships and
communications between the Party as a whole and the peasantry.
Fifth, the elections generate incentives for the peasantry in managing
their own affairs (Bai Yihua, Yang Kaiwang and Chih-yu Shih
1998:260-261).
Since the concept of self rule for the mass organization was first
conceived in the 1980s and elections of the village committee heads
started in 1988 , why did the CCP leadership blow up the issue into
one of the major pieces of political structural reform in the
mid-1990s? During Clinton 's 1998 visit to China, he was invited to
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discuss village elections with the peasants in Xia He village near
Xi an (Ming Pao 27 June 1998). There were four reasons. Firstly, the
most thorny issues in the Sino-US relationship were first the Taiwan
problem and second the human rights issue. In the aftermath of the 4
June crackdown, human rights became the issue that the US
government must handle with China. China's human rights record
was so poor that it was practically defenseless in the face of the US
accusations. Every ye訂 since the ear1 y 1990s the issue of human
rights would heat up as the Congress renewed the Most Favored
Nation trade status of the PRC. China began to use two tactics to
counter attack. First, publishing a human rights report on the USA
and charging the USA with adopting double standards or selective
standards in assessing the human rights record of other countries.
Second, trying to play up the self rule village committees elections
and claiming that China, in fact, has more basic democratic rights
for the people than the USA. Secondly, the village elections could
serve as delaying tactics by the hard-liners to the reformists within
the Party who was asking more radical reform pace. Thirdly, since
the reform started in the late 1970s , the Party's totalistic power over
society in general and in rural areas in particul缸， had shrunken
considerably. The stability in the rural areas indeed worried the
leadership. By allowing the elections to take place , at least the
elected heads would have legitimacy and would perform as best as
they could to win the next elections and thereby stabilize the
situation in the rural areas. According to an internal document , the
Party structure has collapsed in up to 30% of China's village. 7
Fourthly, the village committees are mass organizations of self rule
and they are not even part of the formal executive structure of the
political system. They are extremely remote from the power core in
Beijing and therefore certainly would not threaten the power base of
the CCP.
Are the village elections truly democratic? In an empirical
study, Robert A. Pastor and Qingshan Tan (2000) have observed
many such elections and discussed with many Ministry of Civil
Affairs (MCA) officials. They have come to the following
conclusion. First, there was not a complete set of data on the entire
country. In response to the question posed to the MCA officials
about how many village elections were conducted according to the
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election laws , the officials answered “ Perhaps 50% , frankly we do
not know." Party village secretaries usually served on the village
election committee that supervised village elections and therefore
could wield enormous influence in election outcomes. According to
their estimate , probably less than half of the village heads ran
competitively. There has been widespread use of proxy votes and
secret balloting was not always used. There were also different
voting procedures even though the MCA had been trying hard to
standardize them. One thing the authors were sure was that "There is
no evidence that national leaders are trying to control villages. This
may be because the Communist P訂ty is not threatened by village
elections.. ..The Party's interest in free elections , however, might not
be so impartial if the elections move up the ladder of the
government" (Robert Pastor and Qingshan Tan 2000:508-509).
1n another study identifying the locus of decision- making
power in the Chinese village , Jean Oi and Scott Rozelle (2000)
suggested that the broadly inclusive village assemblies and partially
-elected village committees meet only infrequent1 y. Moreover, there
appeared to be wide variations in the actual power for the smaller
village committees (5 to 7 persons). For some , the elected committee
is the seat of power decision , for some the Party secretary decides
every thing. The variations seems to tie in with the nature of village
economy and the changing bases of power in China's countryside
after the de-collectivization in the early 1980s. However, they found
out that the percentage of Party members in the village committees
(64 0/0 and 65 0/0 in two cases) were more than the MCA officials
claimed (25 to 35% generally) (2000:521).
According to a Chinese social scientist, unlawful activities were
widespread and they could be manifested in the following five ways
(Bai Gan 2001)8. First, bribery to gain the necessary votes to be
elected. One vote normally costs from 20 yuan to 30 yuan. However,
a Party secretary of a village in Yangjiang City, Guangdong Province
spent totally 300 ,000 yuan for votes and also manipulated the ballot
to be elected as the director of the village committee. Second ,
appointed or assigned elections , this means that instead of allowing
the villagers to vote , the township government directly appointed or
assigned the director or committee members. Third , the election
organizati
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competitive elections to be held; not providing secret ballots; not
selecting formal candidates in the villager representative meeting;
sometimes electing the director or members of the village
committees by the village representatives only, etc. Fourth, illegal
procedures , for sometimes the electoral committees were selected by
the township government; sometimes votes by proxy were not
strict1 y carried out by relevant laws; ballots were not counted;
sometimes voter participation failed to be reported , etc. Fifth , there
were various ways to sabotage the elections by unlawful means.
Sometimes the old members refused to transfer power to the
newly-elected members and sometimes the town government
dismissed the elected director or members without going through a
village meeting (Bai Gang 2001: 17-21).9
The revised Organic Law of the Village Committees was passed
by the 5th SC of the NPC in November 1998. With that, the village
elections or self government shed their trial status and elections
procedures have been standardized. According to the Law, the
elections must be competitive and the voting must be secret (article
14) , and “ the members of the village committees are to be elected
directly by villager; they may not be designated , appointed or
replaced by any organization or individual" (Article 11) , etc.
However, in a move to guarantee the dominance of the Party, the
new Law stipulates that the Party branch is the village's “ leadership
core “ (l indao hexin) (article 3). Therefore , ultimately,“Elections are
designed to increase mass support for the Party, and grass-root
democracy is understood to be fully compatible with strong state
control" (O'Brien and Lianjiang Li 2000:488-489)
Jiang Zemin at one time called for the expan~ion of direct
elections from the village to the township leve 1. The population of a
township constituted about 100 ,000 people. According to Jiang , the
local elected organs of power and self-goveming mass organizations
in both urban and rural areas shall establish a sound system of
democratic elections. 1ndeed , there was breakthrough in the electoral
system in the 1990s. 1n November 1998 , a small township called
Buyun in Sichuan province held a direct election for the township
magistrate (Ming Pao 11 , 12 , 13 , February 1999). The election was
competitive. 1n the end the Party representative won by a majority of
12 votes and the election was declared valid by th
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big step forward in the personnel reform. According to the PRC
constitution, the township level has direct elections in the deputies to
the local people's congresses. The election was a breakthrough
because people were electing an executive head not the legislators to
the local people's congress.
Unlike the Buyun election in Sichuan which gained widespread
publicity, there was another form of election of the township
govemment head in the late 1990s , which received much less
attention. Arguably the question of constitutionality regarding the
Buyun election was debatable but the election in Dapeng town ,
Longgang District, Shenzhen was perfectly constitutional when the
CCP launched the so-called “ two ticket" election in electing a
township head. The electorate could forward their candidates and
five were confirmed as candidates and they were voted (first round)
on by the electorate of the whole town. The one with the highest
votes was recommended to be the only candidate to be voted in the
second round of election by deputies of the local people's congress
which was in congruence with the state constitution (Wang Weiping
2000: 17-22). However, the Biyun and Dapeng experiences seemed
to have confined to Sichuan Province and Shenzhen. 1n November
2001 , a circular issued by the central authorities demanded that the
upcoming elections in township and village be conducted strictly
according to law which had the effect of banning direct elections at
the township levels (SCMP 22 November 2001). Since the Sixteenth
CCP Congress in November 2002 , the CCP top leadership has
decided that to develop intra-party democracy is more appropriate
than developing grass-root democracy (Ming Pao 10 October 2003;
Ta Kung Pao 11 October 2003).
Fighting Against Corruption as a Reform Strategy
Corruption could be defined as the use of public power in
pursuit of private benefits (Wang Hunin 1990: 145; Hu Angang 2001:
2-4). 1n the Chinese context, the immoral conduct is manifested in
many aspects: lnisappropriation of public or government fun血，
recelvmg or offering bribes , involvement in smuggling activities ,
collecting taxes illegally, recelvmg kickbacks and exchanging
benefits , etc. It must be admitted that in the 1950s and 1960s , there
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were relatively fewer corruption cases in the PRC. The most serious
case was the case in 1952 of the district Party secretary of Tianjian
called Liu Jiansan who was involved to an amount of one hundred
seventeen thousand yuan. At the same time there were repeated
political campaigns such as Three Antis and Five Antis campaigns to
stamp out co叮upt elements of bourgeois or anti-revolutionaries.
Anti-corruption then was taken as a form of c1 ass struggle. The mass
purges in the political campaigns prevented people committing
corruption because people were afraid of being perceived as c1 ass
enemies by the new regime (Wang Hunin 1990:33-45). The political
and ideological campaigns eliminated the chances of corruption.
The situation changed completely after the reform and open
door policies were launched in the late 1970s. The focus of the
Party's work had shifted from ideological struggles to economic
construction and mass political campaigns basically stopped.
Huntington (1968: 59-6 月 argued that in the modernization process ,
corruption tends to increase tremendously because of three reasons:
Firstly, the drastic social changes cause traditional values to change.
Behavior that was accepted by traditional norms would not tolerable
by modernized values , such as equality, freedom , openness and
transparency, etc. Secondly, the process of modemization has created
new venues of prosperity and wealth. New social groups of wealth
were also created and this might cause the traditional power elite to
exchange political power for tìnancial benefits and social groups
want to gain political access to the ruling elite through wealth.
Thirdly, the process of modernization produces a demand to enhance
the control of governance on the part of the central government and
this creates the chances of corruption in the centralization process.
Evidently, the CCP leadership was aware of the seriousness of
the rampant corruption and its impact on the legitimacy of the CCP.
In November 1979 , Deng Xiaoping made a speech (1983: 187-202)
against special privileges be given to senior cadres because these
would make the senior oftìcials detached from the common people.
In August 1981 , the Central Discipline Committee sent a decree to
the provincial and local Discipline Committee , demanding strict
discipline be applied to all Party members. In November 1983 , the
Second Plenum of the Twel 丘h CCP passed the Decision
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General Office decreed that all phenomena of co口uption including
fund embezzlement, briberies , and privileges of cadres be ceased.
1mportant provisions and regulations were pronounced to guide the
behavior of the Party members. For example, Certain Proν isions
about the Political Life in the Pa仰 in 1980 , the Decision to Fight
the Serious Criminal Activities in the Economic Arena in April 1982,
the Provisions 01 Prohibiting the Party/state Apparatus Setting
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1n the 1990s , nearly every year Jiang delivered a speech to the
Central Discipline 1nspection Committee , emphasizing the
importance of a clean government and the style of work of the Paliy.
He even raised the campaigns against corruption to the level of life
and death for the CCP (J iang 2001 :4 75). Since the mid-1990s ,
unlike before , instead of emphasizing the Party's examplary
functions and the role model emulation effect or the supervisory
functions of the Party, the top leadership has been stressing the
importance of zhidu (institutions). Jiang (200 1: 477-478) said that
“ We must rely on institutional innovation to root out corruption. This
is one of the important lessons we have learnt from the pas t. Good
institutions can prevent effectively the spread of corruption and , on
the contrary, bad institutions can spread corruption." Therefore ,
graft-fighting units were set up across the country. By mid-1996 ,
more than 1700 Anti-corruption Bureaus had been erected in 29
provincial , 289 district and municipal levels and 1,400 grassroots
Procuratorate. Mechanisms of public participation in fighting
corruption were also established. There were 2929 centers or
hotlines where citizens could file reports and complaints (Ming Pao
October 9 1995)
Despite all these rhetoric and measures, corruption was
sprouting across the country. There was a tremendous increase from
the 1980s. The number of corruption cases can be seen from the
following tables for the 1980s:
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Table 1
Number andA
f Corruotion and Briberv Cases in the 198
Amount
Over 10 thousand
Over 100 thousand
Over 200 thousand
Over 500 thousand
Source: Wang Hunin 1990: 66-68
In the 1980s, corruption and bribery cases involving an amount
of more than 500 thousand yuan were relatively few. ll In 1980 ,
when the minister of trade Wang Lei refused to pay in a Beijing
restaurant and caused a public outcry, he was publicly criticized by
the Central Discipline Inspection Committee (CDIC). This was the
first senior official at the provincial level who was exposed and
condemned. However, the first senior provincial level official who
was charged with a criminal offence and subsequently imprisoned
did not occur until 1987. By the late 1990s, the number of
middle-ranking and senior officials who comrnitted corruption had
shot up sharply. In 1999 , according to the annual report of the CD此，
the number of 。在icials who were prosecuted was as follows: 4092 at
county/department level , 327 at districtlbureaus level , 17 at
provincial/ministerial leve l. In 2000 , 4146 county/department level ,
331 前 districtlbureaus level , and 21 前 provincial/ministerial level
(The Mirror February 2000:31). Moreover, the amount involved was
shockingly large. For example in 1996, there were 397 cases of
corruption that involved amounts from one million to ten million
yuan , and 59 cases amount of more than ten million yuan (The
Mirror November 2000:35). The highest official who was executed
over criminal charges of corruption had accepted bribes up to 40
million yuan in 2000. In 1999, the Party secretary of Ningpo city
misappropriated public funds amounting to 1.2 billion 叭lan and the
vice-mayor of Shenyang lost 36 million yuan gambling in Macau. In
a district in Guangdong , an official who was in charge of a financial
department appropriated public funds up to 150 million yuan (The
Mirror April 2000:21 ).12 By the end of the century, even the CCP
leaders admitted that five important feature characterized the
rampant corruption: first, most cases involved a great amount of
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money; second, senior officials were involved; third , organized/gang
corruption occurred; fourth , officials joined criminal gangs; fifth ,
power greedy officials were making quick profit out of the post (The
Mirror March 2000:26).
Without doubt, corruption caused gre剖 losses to the Chinese
government. Many customs officials in Fujian, Guangdong and
Guangxi provinces were involved in smuggling activities and the
financial loss for the state levies could be seen from the following
tables.
Table 2
~~

.

Value of each case
NO.ofcases
Value
caught
(1 00 million)
(100 million)
0.07
0.07
0.05
1979
0.51
0.14
0.51
1980
1. 06
1. 06
0.30
1981
1. 02
1. 02
1982
0.31
1983
0.59
0.59
0.17
1. 36
1984
1. 36
0.50
1985
7.09
7.09
3.00
1986
6.11
6.11
3.31
1. 67
1. 67
1. 28
1987
1988
2.34
2.34
2.29
1989
5.58
5.58
4.67
1990
6.01
6.01
5.15
7 .l 3
1991
7.13
5.35
1992
13.18
13.18
13.24
1993
23.00
23.00
33.96
1994
22.88
22.88
34.59
1995
44.30
44.30
75.96
1996
92.89
92.89
15 1. 53
1997
67.35
67.35
92.70
1998
83.81
154.00
183 .57
Source: Economic Journal 26 January 1999 (Quoted from Hu
Angang 2001 :52)
Year

Although the number of smuggling cases caught was relatively
fewer in the 1990s than the 198 郎， the amount uncovered was much
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larger. This trend had been increasing since the late 1980s. In 1998,
the amount was 15 .4 billion yu徊， a great loss to the state revenue.
Moreover, according to Hu Angang (2001 :34), the financial loss
caused by di在erent types of corruption amounted to 13.2 0/0 to 16.8%
of China's GDP by the second half of the 1990s. As he said,
“ Corruption has become the greatest social pollution in China"
(2001:62). Furthennore , according to Vito Ta凹， an IMF analyst ,
corruption would bring consequences other than just financialloss to
the govemment. First, corruption would paralyze the governmental
ability to exercise effective supervision over public sectors. Second,
corruption would distort the incentive mechanisms as people would
indulge in non-productive activities. Third, corruption would add to
the extra cost of production and services. Fourth , corruption would
distort the government ability to enforce agreements and property
protection. Fifth, corruption would decrease the legitimacy of the
market economy and sometimes even democratic politics. Sixth,
corruption would deprive the poor of the opportunities of earning
potentialities. 13 Hu Angang explicitly pointed out (2001: 22) that
“ The main source of corruption comes from the Party/state in which
extremely complicated and possessing various degrees of influences
of interest groups have been formed. A significant part of these
groups have evolved into what the former Soviet Union bureaucratic
privileged strata. They try to maximize their interest and at the same
time they become the greatest obstacle to reform anti-corruption
drive. This is an essential feature of social change since the reform
and open policies were launched." The root of the rampant
corruption lies in the uncqecked power of the CCP. The CCP has
more than sixty million members and the Party members hold
thousands of position ranging from village head to the state president.
Moreover, the Party holds that the Party should dominate in every
field. In the reform era, despite the shrinking power in the Party/state
over society, the tremendous national resources are at the hands of
the Party apparachi k. Mass media have been under strict control
from the Central Propaganda Department. In the name of political
stability, many serious cases of corruption were forbidden to be
reported. 14 The problem is that basically nobody watches the
watchdog.
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Conclusion
Since the reform started in the Third Plenum of the Eleventh
CCP Congress , Deng Xiaoping was the key figure in the whole
reform era until he died in 1997. He claimed himself to be the core
of the second generation of the CCP leadership since 1949. His
anointed successor Jiang Zemin was the core of the third generation.
In the twenty years of the reform process under them China's
economic structure and , to some extent, its political structure had
changed significantly. First, the replacement of public ownership
by mixed mode of ownership induding private ownership. Now,
individuals can own private properties and set up private business ,
and through the shareholding system the state sectors were
transformed into non-state sectors. Second , China's GDP growth rate
between 1980-1990 averaged 9.5%. In politics , the Marxist orthodox
line was abandoned and class struggles as the key link discarded.
Then four modernization became the primary task of the CCP. In the
past twenty years the NPC , Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference and State Council underwent different degrees of reform.
In addition , there were elections at the village and township levels.
However, the limitations of these reforms were evident. The nature
ofthese reforms in Deng and Jiang's eras were different. The turning
point was the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement in 1989. Before
the crackdown , Deng's political structural reform was hindered by
internal “ two front" struggles , i.e. ultra-leftist tendencies and
bourgeois liberalization. In the 1990s , to enhance the legitimacy of
the CCP in the wake of oppression, the consolidation of political
power was the primary goal of the politicalline , to prevent “ peaceful
evolution" by the Western capitalist countries. The implementation
of the political reform became a means to maintain the incumbent
political system and its main goals were to facilitate economic
marketization and maintain societal stability.
In the 1990s , the dilemma of the political structural reform was
less complicated than that of the 1980s but the pace of the reform
slowed down. The term political reform disappeared from the mass
media for a while and it re-emerged only at the end of 1989. The
goal and contents of the political reform had changed. The
“ separation" concept of the Party and government disappeared and
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the strengthening of the Party leadership became the main threat in
the new stage of political reform. Deng began to talk about the
fine-tuning and perfecting “ democratic centralism" within the Party,
which means overt dissension from the Party would not be allowed.
To avoid the repetition of the June 4 events , the center of the Party
could not be spli t. There was no mention of the separation of the
Party and govemment after the Political Report in the Fourteenth
CCP in late 1992. The slogan had changed to the “ perfection of
socialist democracy" and the primary concem was with stability as
the slogan went “ stability must overwhelm everything." At the
Fourteenth CCP Congress, the scope of the political structural
reform was narrowed to streamlining the Party and state
administration , to carrying out a new civil service system, and to
promoting multi-party cooperation under CCP and spiritual
civilization.
In the 1980s , the main concem of Deng Xiaoping's notion of
political structural reform was the separation of the Party and
govemment, but the main focus in the 1990s , was on the efficiency,
or effectiveness of the NPC and administrative body. Moreover, the
CCP leadership emphasized the separation of the government from
the enterprises, which means the administrative units should cease
the intervention with the state enterprises. The move to separate the
Party and government took a backward step comparing with
separation of the Party with govemment.. Political power was more
overtly concentrated. All the Standing Politburo Committee
members filled the key Party/state posts. Jiang Zemin alone
occupied the posts of the state presidency, the Party
general-secretary and chairman of the CMC. Li Peng was the
premier and Li Ruihuan became the chairman of the CPPCC and
Qiao Shi the chairman of the NPC. The fusion of power or the
concentrated power pattern had a beautiful name “ cross leadership".
The tradition has stayed until today.
Notes:
1 Since the early 1990s , students of Chinese politics have lost interests in the concept
of cycles and the academic discussions have been on the notion of corporatism and
civil society. See Wong Yiu-chung and Chan Che-po (2002) .

Censorship was even applied to the foreign dignitaries . Hi l1 ary Clinton's
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autobiography Living Histoηwas translated into Chinese and published in the PRC in
2003 . However, references to Harry Wu's imprisonment in China, 4 June events and
human rights in China were deleted from the book (Apple 26 September 2003). Most
interestingly, the Party newspaper People s Daily was censored by local authorities
On 28 August 2003 , the edition of People s Daily carried an article titled “明而o tore
down the building , but for whose profit?" , criticizing 出e officials of Jiangxi province
The edition did not appear until two days later and fo叮 pages were removed .
1 and my colleague have done some empirical studies on the role of the Party
secretary and the director in the state enterprises. See Wong Yiu-chung an-ct Chan
Che-po (2002)

3

The use of electronic media had been instrurnental in the dernise of the forrner
Soviet Union. The spread of intemet in China had caused some observers to rnake a
sirnilar prediction (Gordon Chang 2001). Would the Soviet expe口 ence be repeated in
China? For detailed analysis , see chapter 8

4

5 For details in the number of staff in each ministry, commission and bureau , consu Jt
GOSC (1 995). However, the nurnber of personneJ in the Mi nistries of Defense ,
NationaJ Security, Public Security, Supervision and the Commission of National
Science and TechnoJogy, Office of Taiwan Affairs and Office of the Press , was not
released. Some statistics are very interesting. For example the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs had the largest established staff (2000) , fo Jl owed by the Ministry of Finance
(950) and Ministry of Agriculture (925). However, a bureau dealing with patents has a
staff of 1260
The 10 th NPC in March 2003 , at which Wen Jiabao was elected to be the premier,
did not introduce any reform program in the State Council make up. Only two
rninistries were cancelled

6

7

Mark O'Neill (1 997). A vote for the village. South China Morning Post, 12 April

According to Bai (2001) , his report was based on on-site observations and
investigations and letters of appeal or disclosure to the departments of civiJ a旺airs. 1
doubt very much that the Westem observers of the village elections could ever gain
access to these letters

8

According to a report of Southern Weekend , in city of Qianjiang in Guangdong , for
the term from 1999 to 2002 , in a total of 329 elected village heads and members , 187
people were driven out of post because of ‘ incompetence' and 432 vice heads and
members were removed illegally (Apple 27 September 2002)

9

10 There was a debate as to whether the election of the township government head
was constitutionaJ or not , because according to the Chinese constitution, the township
head shouJd be elected by the corresponding level ofpeople 's congress not directly by
出 e people
II However, in the 1990s even in one province Huipei officials cornmitting corruption
amounted to 2244 officials. 718 cases involved amount rnore than 100 thousand YUan'
59 cases between 500 thousand yuan and one million , 8 cases dealing more than 10
million (The Mirror March 2001 :32)

12

ln the 19905 , thεt'w.O highε5t Party治tate leadεr5 who were convicte吐 of cormption
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were CCP Politburo member the former Beíjíng mayor Chen Xítong and více
chaírman of the SCNPC Cheng Kejíe. The híghest seníor officíal who was executed
for the crime was více govemor of Jíangxí provínce Hu Changqing ín 1999. Chen's
case , ín fact , was more polítícal nature 也an financial. The amount was more than a
millíon yu血， the case was not so serious 臼 comp位ed wíth other corrupted officials
Most belíeved that hís power struggles with Jíang Zemín caused hís downfall
Cher嚕 's case involved more 也徊的 míllíon yuan
13

Quoted from Hu Angang (2001) , pp.228-231

14 One of the recent examples was the Shanghaí bíllíonaire Chou Chengyí. It was
reported that he had conspired with the Shanghaí officíals in the 1990s to get hundred
of hectares of urban land wíthout spending too much. He was able to borrow bíllíons
of dollars 台om the banks through personal connections (Open July 2003:23-27)
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